Standing Committee F

[Mr. Jimmy Hood in the Chair]

Criminal Justice and Police Bill

Clause 3 - Amount of penalty and form of penalty notice

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 79, in page 3, line 20, leave out `give' and insert 
`include a statement by a constable with respect to the alleged offence giving'.—[Mr. Heald.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Jimmy Hood: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following amendments: No. 17, in clause 6, page 4, line 18, at end insert
`and the constables' witness statement to be served therewith, including the form and length of such a statement.'.
 No. 16, in clause 8, page 5, line 20, at end insert— 
`( ) The statement is to be treated as admissible as evidence to the like effect as oral evidence to the like effect by that person for the purposes of section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 even though the conditions mentioned therein are not satisfied provided that such conditions as may by order be prescribed by the Secretary of State are satisfied. 
 ( ) The power to make an order under subsection ( ) shall be exercisable by statutory instrument and no such order shall be made unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House.'.

Charles Clarke: We were debating at some length the statement by the constable and the nature of the notices. I emphasise that the penalty notice will be just that. It will include sufficient information about the offence, which is its purpose. The hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) was correct to say that the statutory defence is an identity. That would need to be considered, but a full statement should not be needed in every case.
 It may help if I set out how the system will work. Under clause 3(3)(c), all fixed penalty notices must 
``give such particulars of the circumstances alleged to constitute the offence as are necessary to provide reasonable information about it''. 
The purpose is to allow the suspect, in the cold light of day and possibly on advice, to make a sober and rational judgment about whether to pay the penalty or request a trial, which is also set out on the fixed penalty notice. Under clause 8, we have allowed the possibility of the penalty notice, or any additional statement that the issuing officer gives with it, serving as a witness statement for the purpose of any subsequent trial. Thus, the police have been given the flexibility to deal with the needs of a specific case. 
 The hon. Gentleman will make his customary and not unreasonable remarks about guidance. Guidance may address the types of case in which a fuller additional statement may be advisable. I can cover that more fully if the Committee so requires.

Oliver Heald: Will the Minister read that part again?

Charles Clarke: I will read the part about guidance again.

Nick Hawkins: I hope that the Minister is not going to read out the whole lot.

Charles Clarke: I did not approve of the hon. Gentleman reading out the submission of the Criminal Bar Association but not the 110 submissions made by everyone else.

Jimmy Hood: Order. I am sure that that conversation is very interesting. If hon. Members want to intervene to ask the Minister to amplify something, that is fine, but I ask them not to have a conversation across the Floor.

Charles Clarke: I apologise for my part in that conversation, Mr. Hood. It was out of order.
 I was saying that the police have been given the flexibility to deal with the needs of a specific case, but guidance may address the types of case in which a fuller additional statement may be advisable.

Oliver Heald: Does that mean that the statement could be included in the fixed penalty notice?

Charles Clarke: Yes, clause 8(2) says that it could be. We allow the penalty notice, or any additional statement that the issuing officer gives with it, to serve as a witness statement for the purpose of any subsequent trial.
 The purpose of the amendments is clear. The Bill specifies that a penalty notice must give the particulars that I set out. Those particulars will be filled in by the constable issuing the notice, whether on the street or at a police station. Amendment No. 79 would add another requirement for the particulars to be given in 
``a statement by a constable with respect to the alleged offence''. 
Amendment No. 17 would allow the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police about constables' witness statements issued with penalty notices. Amendment No. 16 would allow the constable's statement made in support of the penalty notice to be treated as oral evidence. We agree with the central point of the Opposition amendments: it is right that every penalty notice issued contains information about the alleged offence. The alleged offender must know what he is supposed to have done. We consider that the current wording in the Bill provides adequately for that. Clause 6 already includes a power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the exercise of police discretion and the issuing of penalty notices, with a view to encouraging good practice in connection with the operation of the scheme. That is sufficient to cover any guidance that might be required. Amendment No. 17 is therefore not necessary. 
 We do not intend that, in every case when a penalty notice is issued, it should be accompanied by a constable's witness statement. That will be necessary only when the trial date is arranged in advance under clause 7, which we expect to occur only in support of planned operations. I explained the situation under clause 8 a moment ago. I am trying to explain—I hope coherently—that although we understand the thrust of the amendment, we do not think that it is necessary. What the hon. Gentleman is proposing is covered elsewhere in the Bill.

Oliver Heald: The first offence under clause 1(1) relates to section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872. It concerns
 ``Being drunk in a highway, other public place or licensed premises.'' 
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Oliver Heald: Before the Division, I was asking the Minister about the offence under section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872. Would it be enough for the officer to write on the fixed penalty notice,
``found in the street, drunk and incapable''? 
Are there similar formulas that are short, pithy and to the point, which could be used in respect of the other offences?

Charles Clarke: The short answer is yes. All fixed penalty notices must have adequate particulars of the offence, and such particulars could well be in the form described by the hon. Gentleman. I am sure that the police will develop, as they do in other areas of work, precisely the type of pithy words that will meet his point.
 In addition to the adequate particulars of the offence being on the fixed penalty notice, the police can choose to give an additional fuller statement. It might be typed up in the police station. That will not usually be necessary and is not a requirement under clause 8. Either the fixed penalty notice or an additional statement may serve as a formal witness statement for the purpose of the trial. The constable must certify that he filled in the fixed penalty notice or that he gave details in a witness statement. I have dealt with the points that have been raised and I hope that, on consideration, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Oliver Heald: I am concerned about what has been said. We want fixed penalty notices to be served when the offences are not particularly serious and involve only minimum extra paperwork for the police. A case that must be served with a full statement and the fixed penalty notice will add to the paperwork. I am not saying that that must happen in every case. I agree with the Minister that there would be a class of cases for which that would not apply. However, if it does apply I do not understand the advantage in serving a fixed penalty notice. That would be extra work for the police. Why cannot we use a pithy expression such as the one used by the Police Superintendents Association, such as
``found in the street, drunk and incapable'' 
or a similar formula. 
 Let us consider the second offence under clause 1, for example, which is 
 ``Throwing fireworks in a thoroughfare''. 
A constable could write, ``Threw a firework in St. Peter's street'', for example. However, if the matter were to become more complicated and a statement were not contained in the fixed penalty notice, I do not understand the advantage of the fixed penalty notice. It would simply add to the work of the police.

Charles Clarke: Obviously, I have not made myself clear. Will the hon. Gentleman accept that it is up to the individual police officer to choose whether he wants to write anything in addition to the pithy statement on the fixed penalty notice form? That is a matter for that police officer's professional judgment in any given set of circumstances. There is no requirement for him to do so; on the contrary, it would be exceptional of the police officer to do so. Such matters will be clarified further in the guidelines.

Oliver Heald: I understand that there will be discretion, but we have been told throughout the proceedings that there will be guidance. If that states that the police officer may write a lengthy statement and deal with the matter in the same way as he would deal with an ordinary offence, I do not understand why that would be sensible. As the Police Federation said:
 ``This, possibly, is a fast-track system...But the following day, they may dispute the behaviour and allege the police acted wrongly. They may try and plead not guilty or propose to plead not guilty...So the fixed penalty ticket may be an addition to the set of papers that have already been issued. That is the issue for us. It will be a good system if it reduces bureaucracy''. 
However, let us consider what would happen if a substantial proportion of cases required all the usual paperwork as well as a fixed penalty notice. If the officer had to solemnly fill in the fixed penalty notice and then make a further statement, I do not see the advantage of the system. Unless the Minister can convince me on that, I will press amendment No. 79 to a vote, but I shall withdraw the other two amendments in the group.

Charles Clarke: I have no particular desire to avoid the hon. Gentleman's pressing the amendment to a Division but I shall tell him, just for the purposes of clarity, that a paperwork issue can arise only when the individual who has been given a fixed penalty notice decides that they would prefer to take the matter to trial, as they have been informed that they may; in other words, they would be in exactly the position that they are in now, except that a fixed penalty notice would have been written.
 We expect such cases to be in the overwhelming minority, obviously, because we expect that a fixed penalty notice will be served only in those circumstances where, by agreement, it is taking place along with the other exchanges. That will save all the paperwork that would otherwise have been done.

Oliver Heald: My point is that the cases that are the ones that are likely to be tried are of the type in which a person would want to fill in an extra statement. It is difficult to see why, in those circumstances, one would ever go for the fixed penalty notice option, unless the Minister is telling us that his guidance will suggest that one should. If it is a complicated issue, involving issues of identity, and the officer feels that he really needs a full statement, it is likely to be the sort of case that ends up in a trial.

Charles Clarke: As we made clear in the debate yesterday, the guidance will say that in areas where the identity of the individual is uncertain, for example, the guidance will be not to issue the fixed penalty notice but to use the ordinary approach.

Oliver Heald: I am still not convinced. It seems to me that the fixed penalty notice should be for the simple cases where a person can write out the notice quickly, with a short statement of what the offence is, and if a person starts saying that it should be some more complicated procedure for a body of cases, that is not right. I shall therefore press amendment No.79 and withdraw the other two amendments.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 12.

Question accordingly negatived.

Oliver Heald: I beg to move amendment No. 80, in page 3, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
 `(6) No regulations or order shall be made under this section unless a draft of the same has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament'.
 The amendment is straightforward. It requires the regulations setting the levels of fixed penalties to be debated and dealt with under the affirmative resolution procedure. As we have heard this morning, important issues have arisen about the level of the fixed penalties, the seriousness of the offences, the likely effectiveness of the notices, ability to pay and enforceability. All these issues are involved in the question of at what level the fixed penalty notices should be set, and we think that it would be right for the House to have the opportunity to debate that question, given the sort of debates that we have had today.

Crispin Blunt: I shall rise briefly to support my hon. Friend because the Minister was kind enough to make it clear that he had accepted Opposition amendment No. 9, which would subject orders to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Charles Clarke: I did so in a moment of weakness.

Crispin Blunt: Let us hope that the Minister will have another moment of weakness. It is important that the principle should carry across that if one is to change not only the nature of the offences but the amount of the fine, the matter should go in a positive rather than a negative form before the House of Commons.

Simon Hughes: I am happy to support the amendment. We regularly debate in Committees whether we should have affirmative or negative resolutions. There are two reasons for having an affirmative resolution. First, we are dealing with an area of justice that cannot be scrutinised by the courts if it never gets further than the first stage. Parliament therefore needs to ensure that it grants permission positively for that to happen, rather than just letting it happen.
 Secondly, Ministers will rarely return to the House to change the tariff, given the nature of the debate that we have had. We have never before had a proposal for such wide-ranging offences. Even if later there were to be a change from affirmative to negative procedure because it became accepted within a certain category of offences, that is not the case at the moment. It is an innovative proposal and it deserves to be considered by the House. I have a question that may or may not help my argument. Does a change in the fines tariff require an affirmative or a negative resolution?

Nick Hawkins: There seems to be one additional point that strengthens our case here. As has been repeatedly pointed out, we have no guidance at present, despite the fact that at the end of the preceding debate, the Minister told my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire categorically that the guidance will say this and the guidance will say that. If the Minister can be so sure about what the guidance will say, why cannot we have that guidance? If the Government insist on using only negative resolution procedures, which, as the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes) pointed out, are the subject of regular debates in Committee, it would be much easier for them to maintain that position if we had already seen the guidance. As we have not seen the guidance it is surely necessary, with a novel procedure, for matters to be subject only to affirmative resolution procedure so that each time the House has a fresh opportunity to consider them.

Nicholas Lyell: The Secretary of State seeks the power to set particular penalties in an entirely new situation. The House should play a full part in that. The Secretary of State should know that he will have to come to the House to explain the reasons for particular penalties in these important, and to some extent revolutionary, new areas. They are revolutionary because they deal with areas that are generally accepted as criminal, although they will not give rise to criminality if the fines are paid in the same way as many of the standard fixed penalty fines, such as for parking. Although such fines can be antisocial, they are simply regarded as one of the regulatory items of day-to-day life. Therefore the House should maintain a proper control over the level and the Secretary of State should be aware of it. It is not a precedent. It is not a great burden on the Secretary of State to concede this. I hope that the Minister can tell us today that he will think again and come back on Report with the Bill amended in Government form.

Charles Clarke: As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, we frequently have this debate. I will attempt to describe it in the language of my youth, when we talked about rentamobs and rentaquotes, and say that we are having a rentanaffirmative resolution debate. In fact we must use judgment. That is the purpose of the debate. There is parliamentary control, whatever the circumstances. It is a question of the nature of the parliamentary control.
 I would argue that there is a qualitative distinction between an affirmative resolution on whether a particular offence is brought within the remit of the Bill—which is what we agreed on clause 1 when we agreed with the Opposition's amendment—and an affirmative resolution when we are talking about setting the level of penalty and the regulations providing the form of the penalty. They are qualitatively different, and if there is to be any qualitative judgment that does not simply say that every decision must be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, I cannot think of a better illustration than the qualitative distinction between the question of applying this sanction to a new offence and the question of the level of the penalty and the regulations providing the form of the penalty. 
 My argument is strengthened significantly by observing that the discretion of the Secretary of State in relation to these areas is already highly constrained by the fact that the 
 ``Secretary of State may not specify an amount which is more than half the amount of the maximum fine for which a person is liable on conviction of the offence'' 
and by the various processes that have been set out throughout the Bill. 
 I urge the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire to withdraw his amendment. Unfortunately, I am not in a position to answer the question asked by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey at this minute, but I will write to him about the question of the negative resolution procedure's applying to fines more generally.

Oliver Heald: Given that the Minister would not concede that it should be a quarter of the maximum, and that he will not tell us what level of fines he has in mind, it is not unreasonable for us, as parliamentarians who are supposed to be scrutinising what the hon. Gentleman is up to, to say that we want to be able to debate this when the order comes up because so far he has not told us what he is up to. I do not mean to be disrespectful to the Minister, but he must understand that if he does not provide the Opposition with information, he must expect to have to debate these issues at a later time.

Charles Clarke: Regarding those two specific points, with respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do not think that he can have been listening. On the question of a quarter or a half, I said that I would think about it. I did not simply dismiss the proposal out of hand. I said that I could see a case for it and that I would think about it, and I will.
 On the question of the average level, I said that the responses to our consultation document from a wide variety of organisations were that the fines should be of the order of £50 to £100, and I said that the Government's thinking was not significantly divergent from that. In particular, I said that the hon. Gentleman's suggestion—which I know that he was probing with, not suggesting—that we might have a fixed penalty fine of £2,500 for a particular offence was completely outside the bounds of any proposition that we might have. 
 I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's proposition that I have given no guidance either on the question of the half or quarter or on our approach to the overall level of fines. Obviously, he will decide how to press this point, but I urge him to think again, unless he simply wants to develop a reputation that is traditional to Oppositions—it is not particular to Conservatives—of simply saying that there should be an affirmative resolution on everything that comes along. If there is a question of intelligence and judgment to apply to it, I put it to the Committee that there is a difference between the question whether to bring an offence within the remit of the Bill, where the affirmative resolution does have weight, and the questions of the precise penalty and the precise form of the penalty notice, which I would argue are of a subsidiary level of significance.

Crispin Blunt: I hope that the Minister appreciates that the issue that will give cause for controversy outside this place is the amount of the tariff that the police can impose if these fixed penalty notices become widespread, as the Minister hopes. That will be a matter of controversy. If the Minister's Government or any future Government are then, to a degree, perceived to be smuggling through changes in the tariff, particularly if the maximum remains unchanged at one half—rather than moving down to one quarter, as it may if a Government amendment to that effect is tabled on Report—that will be a legitimate area of controversy and we, as parliamentarians, will not be seen to have done our duty in this respect by implementing an affirmative measure. It is a controversial area, and I hope that the Minister will reconsider the amendment.

Charles Clarke: First, as far as Parliament is concerned, on the negative resolution procedure it is open to the Opposition to pray against a particular order and to have a debate about it. We had such a debate just the other day. I cannot remember whether it was in this Committee or another one, but there was a 20-minute debate about an issue of substance that went through that process. If there is as much controversy as the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, I am sure that the Opposition of the day would feel able to follow that course.
 However, the controversy surrounding the level of the fine and whether it should be £50, £100, £150 or £200 is utterly trivial compared with the controversy about the introduction of the fixed penalty notice system for such offences and new offences that might arise. That is why the affirmative resolution is appropriate in one case but not the other.

Simon Hughes: Will the Minister give way?

Charles Clarke: No, I will not give way. I have done so several times.
 I urge the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire to withdraw the amendment.

Oliver Heald: If the Minister had promised us that, if we prayed against the order in question, he would ensure that we had a debate on it, I might have been tempted to agree to his blandishments. However, as everyone knows, if we pray against such an order, the chances of our securing a debate, given that the decision is entirely in the hands of the Government, will be small. Such a controversial issue should be debated. As the Minister has not given us the draft order, as I had hoped, which would have enabled us to deal with the matter differently, I shall press the amendment to a Division.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 13.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Effect of penalty notice

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Oliver Heald: Clause 4 deals with the accused person's request to be tried for the alleged offence and how he may make such a request. Under subsection (3), such a request must be made by a notice given by the accused person in the manner specified in the penalty notice and before the end of the period of suspended enforcement, which is dealt with in clause 5.
 What form does the Minister expect the request to be tried to take? Might the fixed penalty notice have a tear-off slip that the accused could send, or does the Minister have another idea for dealing with the practicalities involved? The clause specifies 
``in the manner specified in the penalty notice'', 
but it would help to know the Minister's thinking on the matter, especially as the notice may be given to people who are drunk or vulnerable. We want to know what will happen given such problems and in the case of people with disabilities.

James Gray: I hope that I am not wrong in believing that the people who advise the Minister have a prototype of the type of ticket involved. If so, perhaps the Minister will share it with the Committee.

Jimmy Hood: Order. The hon. Gentleman should know that it is not proper for us to draw attention to officials.

Oliver Heald: I notice that the Minister is waving a document in his hand. I have no idea where he got it.

Charles Clarke: The document that I am waving in my hand is the Metropolitan police service fixed penalty notice for a non-endorsable offence, which is already widely available. With courtesy to the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray), it is not a special document. It is simply an illustration of the sort of document one may have. Because my officials are acutely prepared for every eventuality, they have everything to hand that the Committee may possibly need.

Oliver Heald: Is that the sort of notice that the Minister has in mind and does it have a tear-off slip? What is the procedure? What does he have in mind about how an individual would seek a trial?

Crispin Blunt: I may have spotted a problem with clause 4. I hope that, if the Minister cannot answer me now, he will ask for advice on the matter.
 I said earlier that I served on the Committee that considered the Armed Forces Discipline Bill. That Bill introduced an appeals procedure for people who were dealt with under summary discipline in the armed services. Previously, service men agreed to accept the penalty imposed by their commanding officer whatever it was, without appeal. The Bill, because of the Human Rights Act, instituted an appeals procedure for those summary procedures. One effect was that service men were not allowed to be exposed to a higher penalty on appeal than that awarded by their commanding officer. If the commanding officer awarded someone 14 days' detention and that award was appealed, on appeal that award could not be increased by the summary appeals court. 
 I fear that there is a parallel. It was explained to us in Committee that the Ministry of Defence was receiving advice that, under the Human Rights Act, the fact of an appeal could not expose someone to a higher penalty. That is the effect of the clause. If someone is awarded a fixed penalty notice, he will have 21 days, under clause 5, to consider whether to accept the penalty and to discharge his obligation, or to opt for trial. There may be a parallel between the advice given to the Ministry of Defence on human rights legislation and the right for individuals to choose whether to go to trial, which might be seen as an appeal against the fixed penalty notice. I do not know the answer. I simply saw the parallel and invite the Minister to put my mind at rest if it is not appropriate.

Simon Hughes: I shall start where the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) left off. As far as I can read it, I do not think that he is drawing an exact parallel because the system of which he reminds us is an appeals system from an internal disciplinary procedure to a recognised court procedure. However, there is an issue that I thought he was going to raise in relation to the Human Rights Act: self-incrimination. The Minister should at least tell us how he has addressed and answered that point. If by inactivity someone lands himself with the obligation to pay a fixed penalty notice, not having taken the active step of asking for trial, his inactivity renders him liable to penalty, although not an offence. Under the Human Rights Act, someone may argue that, because it is only a penalty, not a criminal offence, the self-incrimination issues that arose in both a Scottish case and a Birmingham Crown court case did not apply. However, will the Minister explain what the effect is of the two-tier system in the context of the Human Rights Act—an issue similar to the one raised by the hon. Gentleman?
 I will raise one wider issue and one smaller issue. Have Ministers addressed at all the wider issue—the fact that the system should work in reverse? If an individual is stopped for one of these offences, he should effectively be given a charge sheet on the spot. However, if he then wanted to take the option effectively to buy himself out of the process, he would have 21 days to ``redeem'' the prospect of a criminal charge. That is a much fairer system, because by definition everyone is kept within the criminal justice system and all rights are open to defence and prosecutor. The individual would still, for example, retain the right to present his financial circumstances. He would have the chance of taking the risk, although it is a certain risk, of deciding to pay his way out of the offence, because he may decide that he is guilty or likely to be found guilty, and would prefer the offence to be disposed of in a non-criminal way. 
 I put seriously the proposition that in relation to all these matters that are not related to street trading, driving or cycling offences, it would be a fairer and more equitable system to have a charge sheet and obligation to report to the police station within 21 days. The documentation could be simple, and the whole process could be effected straightforwardly. If the individual failed to act, the normal process of law would follow. It could have the disadvantage that more people would choose to go to court rather than to take the summary disposal route. However, there is no danger that the person who cannot read, has learning difficulties, does not understand, does not speak English, or is elderly, cannot manage the system, irrespective of the police officer's belief that they can handle all that. 
 I give an historical example of the sort of person who would not have been prejudiced by the proposed system. Derek Bentley lived in the constituency that I now represent, before he moved to Croydon. He was, as we all know, convicted and hanged for an offence for which in the end he was pardoned. Of course, that was a very serious offence. He was, in the old parlance, ``a very simple bloke''. He was not of full intelligence. One of the reasons for which it is thought that he was convicted, apart from Lord Chief Justice Goddard and other matters, was his inability to explain his predicament. Historically, there are many people like that.

Charles Clarke: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is not arguing that a fixed penalty notice might have been appropriate in that case, but is he arguing that the Derek Bentley case is a tribute to the criminal justice system of this country?

Simon Hughes: No, I certainly am not. I am sure that the Minister will be aware that I am not arguing that. There are many cases. In the Hanratty case, we discovered that there had been wrongful convictions. Of course, the criminal justice system is not perfect, but I would rather that there was a trial of my guilt than a finding of an offence without trial. I would always opt for trial. That may be a difference between the Minister and me. The Minister is suspicious of lawyers and courts. I would rather that my case went into a criminal justice system properly than went round the edge. The serious question is whether Ministers have thought about the alternative process, and if not, why not. I would rather that they were honest about that. If they have not thought about the alternative process, could they undertake to commission some research to look at the alternative benefits and disbenefits of that sort of system? I endorse and repeat the request by my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire to know how the procedure will work, which is also covered by the clause as it was by clause 3. I, no doubt like many other people, have been the recipient of fixed penalty notices for motor vehicle parking offences. I concede that on some occasions I did not think that I was rightfully given a notice, because the meter did not work, or some other process, and I completely forgot about it, and time passed and the 21 days ticked over and I then found myself in the other system, and I got 50 per cent. added on and all the other things that happen.
 It is important that people are given clear and accurate information and, if one is requesting a trial, that it is given in a way that is clear, in large print, with advice to take legal advice and the rest. 
 I do not remember ever seeing in any Bill the drafting as in this clause, where we end up with someone called A or B or C or D. I may be wrong about this. This strikes me as an innovation. The question is, is it an innovation? If so, it is a bad innovation. If it is not, where are the precedents for it happening before? Even if it is not an innovation, please may we have the Bill re-drafted, so that we do not have such drafting?

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, because he has anticipated the point that I was also going to make. I was going to ask the Minister precisely the same question, because it also seemed to the Opposition that this drafting is an innovation. If it is an innovation, and I agree with the hon. Gentleman that whether it is or not, it is a bad thing, would he recognise, as I do, that it reads very much like a legal textbook and that in itself is not a helpful way in which statute law should be drafted?

Simon Hughes: I agree with all those things, and it starts to become nonsense. It is a bit like Gilbert and Sullivan, although I cannot remember in which operetta there was an A and a B and so on. If we have got an A here, do I presume that, later in the Bill, there are characters called B and C? It is just nonsense, and we need to get rid of it. Bills are meant to be written in good English, not substitutes for good English, and this is neither English nor good English. It is not coherent and does not read entirely appropriately, and I hope we can have a drafting amendment from the Minister on Report to clear up all this sort of nonsense in legislation like this.

Nicholas Lyell: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, my Member of Parliament, and to find that he has the same parking problems that I had when I resided in his constituency. I should like to raise three important points. The first—I concur with the dislike of the way in which this clause is drafted—is time scale. Subsection (2) says that if A asks to be tried for the alleged offence, proceedings may be brought against him. It may be that some other Act is brought in to bear on this, but could the Minister clarify how long the prosecuting authority, whoever it may be, has to institute those proceedings? In other words, how long does citizen A have to wait before he or she knows that they are in the clear, having written in to request to be tried?
 The second question refers to the manner in which people are expected to write in and request to be tried. It says in subsection (3) (a) that it is the manner specified in the penalty notice, but this is important, because the effect of this missive, this request, is to impinge on the mind of the person who is going to take the prosecuting decision. That is quite likely to affect the decision whether or not to prosecute. If, for example, the piece of paper is simply a tear-off slip which says ``I request to be tried'' and suggests that one signs there, then that will give the prosecuting authority absolutely no information as to whether it is a good idea to try the case or not over and above the statement pursuant to clause 3 giving reasonable information about the offence. However, if a substantial piece of paper is attached with, for example, the opportunity to write 15 or 20 lines of explanation, that could be helpful to the prosecuting authority. I should be grateful if the Minister would comment on that, if the matter has been thought of. 
 That raises the third question: who will take the decision in the case and to what extent will the Crown Prosecution Service be involved? If a prosecution came to court, and one would expect it to do so, as a notice has been issued and a request to be tried sent, I would expect the case to be prosecuted by a member of the CPS, who would have applied his or her independent judgment to whether it was right to prosecute. At what stage will that happen? Will the constable who issued the notice decide whether to take further steps under succeeding clauses to put in place a trial—by giving a warning notice pursuant to clause 7—or will it be an inspector of police or someone else? I should be grateful to the Minister if he would help us on those points.

Nick Hawkins: I wanted to expand on one of the aspects raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey and I am glad that his concern and mine is shared by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire (Sir N. Lyell). Since the court's ruling in Pepper v. Hart, the proceedings in the main Chamber or in Committee can be referred to in court when one is looking to the courts to clarify the intention behind a statute. The point about the inelegant and apparently novel drafting is that the figure of A is not only referred to in the clause but crops up again in clause 7. As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, this novel figure should immediately be abandoned. If we start talking about A and B, it will not be long before we get to X, and X marks the spot. As a Committee, we should give the black spot to this novelty, which will not help anybody and is inconsistent with the way in which statute law is normally drafted. Moreover, anything that makes a statute look like a first-year law student's textbook is a bad example.
 I also want to refer to the tear-off slip debate. The Government may be storing up trouble for themselves of the kind that I mentioned earlier in relation to the way in which local authorities have not used fixed penalty notices properly. As I have said, the Evening Standard has run a substantial campaign, of which I am in favour, to support motorists who have been unable to challenge fixed penalty notices issued by various incompetent and appallingly badly run Labour-controlled London boroughs. The Evening Standard rightly highlighted the fact that, even though there is a parking adjudicator for London, all the cases were transferred en bloc to a court outside London—in this case Northampton. Law-abiding motorists who could prove that their vehicle was not in the place where it was alleged to have been and who were unable to challenge the parking ticket, had to go to Northampton to appeal and those who had busy jobs or limited means found it almost impossible to get there. I hope that the Minister will deal with that matter. Will the Government give an undertaking that when the Bill becomes law, if it does, the fixed penalty tickets will not be transferred en bloc to a court far away from the place where the offences took place? We shall want to see that safeguard in the guidance.

Charles Clarke: Is the hon. Gentleman arguing that fixed penalty notices for parking offences should be abandoned and replaced by a full trial in a magistrates court?

Nick Hawkins: No, of course I am not. To judge by that intervention, the Minister is, to my surprise, unaware of the substantial campaign that has been waged over many months, involving a huge number of examples of the problems that have arisen throughout London. I have some experience of the problems faced by the parking adjudicator for London, who said, ``I cannot deal with some of the London boroughs, because even though I have certain powers as parking adjudicator, the boroughs never respond to my requests for them to look at matters.'' This is a complete nonsense, and the Evening Standard has performed a considerable public service by highlighting the problems. Given that the Government are talking about extending fixed penalties—in the context of this clause, we are talking about tear-off slips—they must be able to ensure certain safeguards. If problems that are particularly prevalent in London spread nationwide—

Helen Clark: The hon. Gentleman talks a lot about parking and parking offences, but, as I understand it, the offences for which fixed penalty notices will be issued relate to disorderly behaviour. I cannot see the relevance of concentrating on parking.

Nick Hawkins: What I am saying is that, given that the Government are talking about their own fixed penalty scheme, I want the Minister to confirm that the problems associated with fixed penalties for parking in London will not arise in respect of this provision. If the Minister can produce guidance or give a firm undertaking that a raft of cases will not be transferred to extremely inconvenient courts when appealed, we will be happy. I hope that he can give some reassurance in that regard.

Charles Clarke: First, I want briefly to reprise the previous debate, so that I can answer the point that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey made about fining, which is subject to the negative procedure. Under section 143(6) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, when fines are revalued they are subject to the negative procedure to which the Committee agreed in respect of the process that we have just discussed.
 With the help of my colleagues, I brandished the form that is in my hand because it is of a type that one can imagine being used. We are discussing the precise nature of the form, and it may well be that the tear-off strip is the right approach to adopt. It is important to emphasise the distinction between the cases to which the hon. Member for Reigate referred. His comments on the armed forces were interesting, but the fact remains that choosing to go to court—a choice open to anyone in the situation that we are discussing—does not constitute an appeal process. The court can impose any fine within the maximum that appears appropriate, but it is not an appeal process akin to that which he described.

Crispin Blunt: I should be grateful if the Minister would seek further advice on this matter. Of course, the military discipline procedure as administered by the chain of command is not seen as proof against human rights legislation. That is one reason why the Government have said that there must be a procedure of appeal to a summary appeals court. That seems fair enough in itself, but my concern is whether, in the light of further advice, this procedure—which is a non-legal procedure in terms of human rights legislation—could expose the person in question to a higher penalty at appeal. Such advice would appear to have originated in the light of appearance in front of a compliant court. I simply wonder whether a higher penalty and exercising one's right to trial might create problems in terms of the Human Rights Act.

Charles Clarke: The hon. Gentleman made his point in the spirit of constructive inquiry. I intended to refer to the Human Rights Act point that he raised in general terms. The Home Secretary has signed a certificate saying that the Bill complies with the Act. That was not a lightly considered act on his part; he signed it after receiving full advice about the various points that were made to him. I have not yet referred to that in this Committee, but I have done so in other Committees on which I have served. We believe that there is adequate flexibility and judicial safeguards in the Bill to ensure fairness and compliance with the Act.
 Even if people do not pay the fixed penalty notice or request trial, they can argue any specific reasons why they should have a trial, when they are called before the fine enforcement court, which can set aside the fine in the interests of justice. That flexible approach deals with the considerations of the Human Rights Act. 
 The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Bedfordshire made several points. The times, processes and so on that are established if individuals decide that they will go to trial on the penalties rather than pay the fixed penalty notices are not affected by the Bill. The normal time scales apply; for example, allowing six months from the issue of the fixed penalty notice, which is the same as the date of the offence, is the standard process in law and not affected by the new measures. The decisions taken by the Crown Prosecution Service will be taken in exactly the same way as they are taken now, on the basis of whether it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. The process that he described as regards the time scale, the manner of the request, the prosecution and the length of time allowed to initiate proceedings will not be affected if an individual chooses trial. The legislation deals only with the circumstances in which the fixed penalty notice is chosen.

Nicholas Lyell: I understood the Minister to say that, if people say that they want to be tried and fill in a slip to that effect, they have to wait six months before they find out whether they are in the clear. That seems a long time—but no doubt the Minister will answer that point more fully in a moment.
 The Minister said that nothing would change as regards the Crown Prosecution Service. I would anticipate that the decision to prosecute would in the first place be taken by a police officer, and that a member of the service would review the matter when it was about to be listed for court. What opportunity will the citizen have to write something that might impinge on the person deciding whether to prosecute—whoever that person is—and on the view of the Crown prosecutor in due course?

Charles Clarke: First, the six months period to which I referred is the maximum period, not the desired period. That situation is not changed by this legislation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman may think that that period should be shorter—an argument for which there is a good case. I am glad to tell him that the Labour Government's approaches to speeding up the criminal justice system will help us to make progress in those areas.
 The process involving the police and the CPS will be exactly the same after the Bill is enacted—if indeed it is—in relation to the individual who chooses trial for any of the offences listed in clause 1. The situation will be identical. The legislation simply allows the police to consider the option of the fixed penalty notice if it seems appropriate, in addition to using the normal process.

Nicholas Lyell: I am not sure that the Minister is right in saying that the situation is exactly the same. In a normal case in which a person is arrested and subsequently summonsed, the matter will be considered before the summons is issued. In this case, the constable, either in the police station or on the street, will have initiated the matter already, before it is referred for immediate reconsideration to the citizen who said that he wished to be tried. Will the Minister enlighten me by telling me what the normal situation is to which he referred? Who will consider the request to be tried and decide whether to press for a prosecution or let sleeping dogs lie?

Charles Clarke: The right hon. and learned Gentleman was Solicitor-General in the previous Government.

Nick Hawkins: Attorney-General.

Charles Clarke: I beg his pardon. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was Attorney-General and Solicitor-General. He has a great deal more experience than I have of the precise operation of the process in each of these circumstances. I am arguing, incontrovertibly, that the process in relation to time, manner of serving, decision to prosecute and so on, is not affected by the Bill in the event that the individual decides to go to trial. I know that he is challenging that interpretation, but that is my view. That is where I stand.

Nicholas Lyell: The difference is that, if a person is arrested, he will be given an opportunity, in the police station, to make a statement. That would be wise if he regards himself as innocent, unless it is a tricky matter needing a solicitor. The statement would therefore be considered before prosecution. In this case, he may or may not be given an opportunity to make a statement—the Minister has not yet answered that—but who will look at the statement and decide whether to press ahead with proceedings if the person has requested to be tried? The Minister is flattering me, but I think that it is because he does not know the answer. If I did know it, I have forgotten it.

Charles Clarke: I was not flattering the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He is a lawyer of great seniority and distinction. I will argue with his politics but not with his seniority and distinction as a lawyer. The point that I am obviously failing to convey—it is not because I do not understand it, although I am the first to admit to him and other lawyers that I do not fully understand many other aspects of the law—is that the process that he describes, of a decision to prosecute an individual who decides to go to court in such a circumstance, will be the same after the Bill is enacted as before. I will reflect for a moment or two on his comments to consider whether I can add anything further during my remarks.
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey asked whether we had considered approaching the matter from the other way round. The answer is yes, but to be honest—he asked me to be honest—we did not consider it at great length. We have argued from the outset that the purpose of the legislation was to give the police an extra option in relation to this kind of offence in the form of the fixed penalty notice, in the type of circumstances that we have discussed. I know that the hon. Gentleman disagrees—he has been clear and straightforward about that. 
 As far as A and B are concerned—when I did arithmetic at school A and B were always filling up baths and tanks, and we had to work out what A doing it at such a speed, and B doing it at such a speed, meant for C—the use of the form A or B is not an innovation. It has been used in several pieces of legislation in recent years, including, I am advised, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000. That is a matter for parliamentary counsel. Such symbols, in the Government's view, can greatly improve the clarity of legislation and avoid over-lengthy and convoluted paragraphs. I have been given an illustration that relates to the speech by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath or the Criminal Bar Association, whichever or whoever was speaking. 
 The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 includes the phrase, 
``references in this section to the recipient are to the person to whom the notice was given''. 
It may be that the terminology of A, B or whatever is simpler to deal with. The use of A or B is no different from the type of description that people use in everyday speech, and makes legislation more accessible. For a barrister, the suggestion that it is like a legal textbook is the ultimate insult. For the lay person trying to understand the law, the secret garden that barristers and lawyers seek to inhabit, which prevents the rest of us understanding what is going on, is something that legislators should try to make a bit clearer. Whether the use of A, B and C succeeds in that goal is a matter of taste. However, that is its purpose, which is something that the Committee should in general support.

Nick Hawkins: Will the Minister give way?

Charles Clarke: I will give way if the hon. Gentleman wants to talk about parking tickets, but not otherwise.

Nick Hawkins: I am not sure that the Minister is able to impose conditions.
 I want to intervene on the Minister regarding what he was saying about A and B. Although he says that it is a matter of taste, would he be prepared—in the light of the united opposition from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire, a former Attorney-General, the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, and myself and my hon. Friends—to reflect on the matter further, given that we all think that it is a bad innovation, even if it started off in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000? One can see a reason in relation to family law matters, where individual parties in cases are anonymised in the law, for using alphabetical symbols. However, in this field of law it is less helpful. As all on the Opposition Benches, from our respective legal practices, are unanimous in feeling that it would be unhelpful and confusing, particularly when A is used twice within four clauses, will the Minister undertake to reflect further with officials?

Charles Clarke: My general working hypothesis is that if a load of barristers are against something, then the rest of public should be in favour of it. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department, who is not in place just at this moment, is an outstanding example of a lawyer who has turned on to the path of justice. I am not sure why the hon. Member for Reigate is laughing at my sincere accolade to my hon. Friend.
 The question of clear language is an important issue for legislators. My prejudices are in favour of the kind of process that we have got here. I agree with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, and perhaps through you, Mr. Hood, this could be passed on, that the relevant offices of the House could think how language is used. I would argue for simplification, for plain English. Something that frustrates me even now—as a relatively experienced Member dealing with complex legislation, such as the Terrorism Act 2000, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—is how inaccessible our legislation is to the ordinary citizen. That is a weakness of our legislating process and anything that we can do to improve it would be a good thing.

Nicholas Lyell: I have spotted another point that the Minister can no doubt clarify quickly. Subsection (5) states:
 ``If, by the end of the suspended enforcement period...
 (b) ``A has not made a request to be tried''. 
Could the Minister state categorically what constitutes the making of a request to be tried? Is it filling in the form, posting the form, or delivering the form to someone? When precisely is that request to be tried deemed to have been made?

Charles Clarke: That is set out in clause 4(3), in the manner specified on the penalty notice. As I said in answer to the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire's first question, we were considering the tear-off slip as a possible means of doing that. but there could be other means of doing it. It is a matter that we specified in universal, which will fulfil the criteria that he sets out.

Oliver Heald: Will the Minister give way?

Charles Clarke: No, I will not give way any more.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 5 - General restriction on proceedings

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 4, line 9, leave out `21 days' and insert `one month'.
 The amendment is the only one selected in relation to clause 5. That is the clause that deals the period between the fixed penalty notice being given to someone, and the period within which they can invoke the process of going to trial—after which the system will act against them because nothing has happened if they have not paid the money. 
 The amendment would extend to 28 days the period of 21 days that was set out under the Bill. I tabled the amendment, first, because 21 days is too short a period; secondly, because people do not think in periods of three weeks; and thirdly, because such a period is far more likely to catch people who did not intend to be caught and, fourthly, because I question whether the matter is not something that should be dealt with by secondary legislation rather than under the Bill. 
 I sense that the general precedent may reflect that time limit in the Bill. I have not done a trawl, but that probably is the case. Again, it would be helpful to know details of the precedent. I am conscious that my proposal raises the question whether a month is 28 days or a calendar month. I am clear in my mind, from personal experience as the recipient of fixed penalty notices as well as for other reasons, that people are far more likely to remember that time is running out if a month passes and they are in a different month. If a person were issued with a parking ticket in February, a trigger mechanism would come into play and he would remember by the end of March that he must do something it. The person would not remember the date or even the day of the week, but he is likely to remember roughly when it was. 
 If the period were extended to the end of the month after the issue of the notice, that would give people reasonable time within which to do something. The enforcement process for not paying or the time within which a person should pay should expire no earlier than a month after the notice was issued. Ideally, it should be on the first day of the month that follows the month when the offence took place. If it is to be a system where money is collected, for heaven's sake let us make it a system whereby people are likely to pay. It must be a system that will give people longer time to pay so those on low incomes will not be disadvantaged. Let us give people a longer time to find the money, so that it will not disadvantage the forgetful and mentally ill.

Helen Clark: I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but I am approaching the matter from the opposite direction. Obviously, two weeks would be far too short a period. That would be ridiculous. However, three weeks would give the offence a sense of tension. Let us consider library fines, for example. To my shame, I was rather late paying them when I was at school. However, if people are allowed longer periods to pay fines, it is human nature to put off paying them, and to think that they can be paid the next week or the week after that.
 We talked earlier about ``Hooray Henrys'', who may be just a type of people who pick up many penalty notices. I would not want them to think that they could simply re-offend and not bother to pay their fines. I am keen to put pressure on such people.

Simon Hughes: The second point made by the hon. Lady would not make the slightest difference. If people incur regular fines, they must have a date when they click into payment. They will not be hugely affected whether they receive another notice in the same period. No theology is involved. I should be interested to know why the Government chose a period of 21 days. They must have received background briefing to reach a conclusion. I strongly urge the Government to make it a longer period. I should be grateful if the Minister would at least say that he will take away the proposal and I seriously ask that a time of at least a month afterwards be considered for all the reasons that I have given. It is a matter of great importance and I hope that the Minister can respond positively. If not, I will put it to a vote.

Jimmy Hood: Before I call the Minister, may I make a point? We have had a number of interventions today and I am getting confused, as are some hon. Members. An intervention is supposed to brief and should not be a speech. I hope that future interventions will be a lot shorter.
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

Charles Clarke: The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey raised the question of the length of time in clause 5. First, as he said a month is significantly less flexible than a period of days such as 28 days, and causes confusion. That is why we usually use the formula X number of days or, as we now say, A number of days or B number of days. On those grounds alone, I urge him to reconsider his amendment.
 Secondly, on the more substantial ground of the length of time involved, we chose the period of 21 days because it is a relatively routine situation. There is a precedent in section 52(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 where 21 days is referred to in the primary legislation. I acknowledge that there is a relatively arbitrary element as between 21, 28, 35 and 14 and there are all kinds of arguments that one can make. We decided to go with precedent. I think that 21 days is a perfectly adequate time to deal with the situation. 
 The hon. Gentleman referred to people who for some reason did not have the capacity to deal with a situation. First, they would be unlikely to be issued a fixed penalty notice. Secondly, if they felt that they had been traduced on the amount of time available, they have the ability under clause 12 to go to court, and the court could decide in the interests of justice not to proceed with the penalty. Those are the reasons for the 21 days. I hope that, on consideration, he will withdraw his amendment.

Simon Hughes: I am slightly surprised that the Minister was not a little more willing to consider the alternatives, and will therefore press the amendment to a Division. The period should be longer. If by some amazing fluke the amendment does not win today, I hope that the Minister will, none the less, regard it as valid. In future, all amendments will substantively come from a Government containing Liberal Democrats in every corner, but that may take just a few more months yet. Until that happy moment arrives, I hope that the Minister will reconsider his response.

Charles Clarke: In the unlikely event of a Liberal Democrat Government being formed in the near future, could the hon. Gentleman tell us how high a priority amending this Bill from 21 days to 28 days would be?

Jimmy Hood: Order. Do not be tempted.

Simon Hughes: I can be short. I did not see it in the draft manifesto. I now ask hon. Members to join me in voting for the amendment on the basis that a longer period would be a good thing.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 1, Noes 12.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Because the period for payment remains in the Bill and has not been amended, I will ask for a Division on the clause as well.

Nicholas Lyell: I shall try again to get the Minister to clarify exactly how the system will work. I listened carefully to the Minister's previous answers, but I may have missed something. What worries me is exactly when the citizen can either indicate that he wants to be tried or stop the process of a trial by paying the penalty issued.
 I suspect that payment of the penalty is comparatively straightforward, at least in theory: the citizen has to get the cheque in the post in time for it to be delivered and received within the 21 day period—although the Minister may clarify that. I suspect that, in practice, another week will be allowed to enable cheques to be cleared. However, it is important for the Minister to spell out what is the precise theoretical time scale and what it is that stops proceedings. 
 The request to be tried is more important. Subsection (2) covers what happens when payment is made, but subsection (3) deals with the request to be tried. What ought to be the case is that, provided that the citizen can demonstrate proof of posting of the request to be tried, or can demonstrate delivery of it to a police station—no doubt the police station specified on the notice—the opportunity for proceedings to be brought ought to be stopped. 
 Why does the clause begin with the words ``proceedings for the offence'' rather than ``proceedings to enforce the penalty''? Where a notice has been issued—which is what this chapter is about—unless it is paid or a request to be tried is made within the given period, what is primarily anticipated is enforcement of the penalty in its increased form as a fine, rather than the issuing of proceedings for the offence. I am not saying that is wrong to have a subsection that states that the authorities cannot start proceedings for an offence for 21 days, but in practice I think that it is enforcement that would not be started for 21 days. I want to know exactly how the citizen brings the matter to a halt, either by paying up or issuing a request to be tried. I need to know the modalities. 
 If the Minister has to tell the Committee, ``We haven't thought through the modalities; they will appear in regulations; we haven't got a precedent; I don't know exactly how it will work; but I will try to help the Committee later,'' I shall understand that, but I want as good an answer as the Minister can give, if he would be so kind.

Charles Clarke: The sentence that opens clause 5—
 ``Proceedings for the offence to which a penalty notice relates'' 
means precisely that. It relates not simply to the enforcement of the fine but to the offence to which the penalty notice relates—one of the offences specified in clause 1. 
 The proceedings may relate to the fixed penalty notice or the trial process. That is why that language has been used. The offence to which the fixed penalty notice relates is the offence specified in clause 1, and the proceedings can be either the fixed penalty notice or the trial. At any point in the 21 days specified, which the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey argued should be 28 days, the person may request to be tried. At any point in those 21 days, as stated in clause 5(2), the penalty may be paid. The 21 days have been provided to allow a choice. They have been provided from the moment of the event happening, and at any point within that time the person may choose which course to take. That is extremely clear. 
 The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Bedfordshire asked about modalities. The modalities are as generally specified in legislation, but I shall be specific in response to his points. The first, which related to clause 4(3), was how the request would be made. The answer is, by a notice given 
``in the manner specified in the penalty notice'', 
as we discussed when we debated the previous clause, and I have nothing further to say about the matter. 
 The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned posting. The procedure specified in clause 9(3) deals with the question of a person's showing that a letter has been posted. The essential modalities of the process are specified in clause 9, which states: 
 ``If a person to whom a penalty notice is given decides to pay the penalty, he must pay it to the justices' chief executive specified in the notice.'' 
The penalty must be paid 
``by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the amount''. 
Subsection (3)(b) refers to showing how the letter was posted. 
 Clause 9 also states that 
``payment is to be regarded as made at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.'' 
Subsection (5) makes it clear that other means of payment are acceptable. Subsection (6) makes it clear that a letter is properly addressed for the purposes of the clause 
``if it is addressed in accordance with the requirements specified in the penalty notice.'' 
The clause specifies the modality as clearly as possible for how payment will be made, and it details the process by which payment will be made. That is as clear as I can be on the matter in endeavouring to answer the right hon. and learned Gentleman's question.

Nicholas Lyell: I am most grateful to the Minister. I entirely accept that when the citizen pays up clause 9 provides a clear procedure, and I apologise for not having spotted that before. However, unless the Minister can draw it to my attention, I see no such clarity about the request to be tried. Will the Minister explain the procedure and modalities for the request to be tried? I have not spotted them.

Charles Clarke: First, the fundamental process is specified in clause 4(3). I do not want to be rude to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I honestly believe that we have been going around this circuit for a considerable time. The modalities of notification of court and date of trial and the right to ask for trial are specified in clause 7, in much the same way as the procedure for the fine is specified in clause 9.
 I am trying to think what else I can say to help the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I believe that the matter is as clear as it could possibly be. I am sorry if that is not sufficient, but I cannot say any more about the matter, and that is not because there is something that I should or do know and am not saying. The Bill is absolutely clear.

Crispin Blunt: My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire made the point that it is not clear exactly what the process will be for the police and prosecution authorities if the penalty is not paid. Will enforcement proceedings automatically take place to get enforcement against A as a fine or will the guidelines deal with a reassessment by the police and prosecution authorities on whether to institute trial proceedings at that point? Will all that become clear in the guidelines on how the police are to operate the system?

Charles Clarke: After the 21 days, the citizen may make his payment or trial request, provided that the fine has not been registered. The chief constable has the discretion to accept late payment or request for trial. Once the fine has been registered, a citizen may make to the fine enforcement court any arguments about how that fine is enforced.
 The hon. Gentleman referred to the prosecution decision. Again, I am trying to think how I can be clearer about it than I have been. Let us imagine that the Bill does not exist in any form and will not go on to the statute book. For each of the offences set out in clause 1, there is a process according to which a trial may or may not take place according to the judgments on prosecution that are made by the relevant authorities in each case. That is the case under section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872, section 80 of the Explosives Act 1875 and so on. The Bill says that, in addition to that process—which is clear, established in law and works reasonably effectively as far as one can tell—there is the possibility for a fixed penalty notice to apply. In the event that such a notice does not apply, because the individual says, ``I want to opt for trial,'' the situation is exactly as it is today, without the Bill being enacted. The process is clear and straightforward.

Oliver Heald: The point of concern is that an officer must have reason to believe that an offence has been committed to issue a fixed penalty notice. Let us imagine that he does so, and the person elects for trial. Is the Minister saying that the whole thing goes back to square one at that point and that the CPS becomes involved and takes a decision on the usual prosecution basis of whether there is a beyond 50 per cent. chance of success and so on?

Charles Clarke: Yes. I was looking anxiously to my learned colleague to ensure that I did not get the answer wrong. Back to square one is as good a way as any of describing the process, which exists today. As now, judgments will be made about the situation.

Crispin Blunt: The point on which I sought elucidation from the Minister was exactly what people can expect if they receive a fixed penalty notice but do not pay it. Will the police and CPS then make a judgment about whether to bring the case to trial or will the process for enforcement be continued? I imagine that it is likely to be a matter of judgment by the police and prosecution authorities. Will the guidelines make clear to people on the receiving end of the process the point at which non-payment of a penalty turns into a trial, rather than enforcement proceedings to get the money for the fine and the penalty, which they presumably accepted by taking the notices?

Charles Clarke: I hope that everyone is clear on the circumstances in which the fixed penalty notice is paid. I thought that we were discussing the choice of trial, on which it was said that there was a lack of clarity. I certainly feel clear about that choice and was trying to offer clarity on it. For the sake of argument, let us use the code of ``back to square one'', which was suggested by the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire.
 The third possibility is that the individual chooses to pay a fixed penalty notice, but does not pay the fine in accordance with his or her commitment to do so. At that point, clause 4(5) comes into play. It says: 
 ``If, by the end of the...period— 
 (a) the penalty has not been paid in accordance with this Chapter, and 
 (b) A has not made a request to be tried, 
 a sum equal to one and a half times the amount of the penalty may be registered under section 10 for enforcement against A as a fine.'' 
In those circumstances, a fine one and a half times the amount of the penalty is registered as a fine to be paid and collected in the normal way through a magistrates court.

Nicholas Lyell: The Minister has answered two of the three questions, but has not clarified what one has to do to register a request to be tried. If one posts it on the 21st day and it arrives on the 22nd, is that good enough? The Bill does not set that out. It sets out a pretty good code in clause 9, but does not set one out for requesting to be tried in clauses 4, 5 or 7. Can the Minister clarify that?

Charles Clarke: With respect to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that is the sixth time that he has asked that question.

Nicholas Lyell: And it has not been answered.

Charles Clarke: It has been answered, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman unfortunately does not like the answer. There we are—I can say nothing further.

Simon Hughes: On some of the fixed penalty notices that I have received, time has passed and I have been asked by written communication whether I had representations to make before a decision was taken. The Bill does not clarify the process between the end of the 21 days and a potential decision to prosecute as a result of normal criminal procedure. Will people be given the opportunity to make representations before a decision is made? In one case where I made representations, I got a nice letter back saying, ``In the light of what you have said, we will take no further action. Thanks very much. Good afternoon,'' for which I was grateful. Is that procedure included in the process and, if not, can we include it?

Charles Clarke: I am aware that I am in danger of being impatient and I do not wish to be. Perhaps I am being stupid and not understanding the point, but the position is as clear as possible. The individual chooses the fixed penalty notice or opts for trial—

James Gray: By what means?

Charles Clarke: By the process set out in the Bill. That is now the seventh time that that question has been asked. The third option is that a fixed penalty notice is chosen but not paid. The Bill sets out fully the process for each of those circumstances, particularly in clauses 4 and 5, but also in clauses 7 and 9. If I am guilty of not having understood the point, I apologise and ask Opposition Members to explain it more clearly. If I am not, the position is clear and direct.

Crispin Blunt: I wanted to make it clear that I have understood what the Minister said in respect of my points on option 3, when someone accepts a notice but does not pay the penalty. Under clause 4(5) a fine not exceeding one and a half times the penalty may be registered against him. Under the Minister's argument, will that person not be liable for trial for that offence, but simply be pursued as a defaulter on the fine? By accepting the fixed penalty notice, will he be immune from being tried for that offence?

Charles Clarke: The answer to that question is yes. As always, I turn to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department, who is more experienced than I am in those matters. I am glad to report that he confirms that the answer is yes.

Nicholas Lyell: At the risk of irritating the Minister—I assure him that it is not my intention—let me say that he has not been as clear as he would wish. We are discussing clause 5, but he rightly relates the question back to clause 4. I am concerned about the modalities of making it clear that one requests that the matter be tried. The Bill says only that
 ``Such a request must be made by a notice given by A...in the manner specified in the penalty notice''. 
The Minister has not told us any more than that, which is not good enough, because it is in precisely that area that problems will arise. 
 I will give the Minister an example, so that he may either concede that he has not thought the matter through properly—which I believe to be the truth—or provide an explanation of how the system would work in that example. Let us suppose that an officer gives me a penalty notice on the first of the month. On the 21st day of the month, I fill in the tear-off slip that accompanied the notice—the Minister has been reasonably clear about that aspect of the process—sign it, requesting that the matter be tried, and post it with a first-class stamp, so that it is delivered the following day: the 22nd day. 
 Have I made the request to be tried in time? The letter may not be delivered for a week, even though I have posted it by first-class post. If I am using the postal system, must I ensure that it is delivered within the 21 days—by paying for next-day delivery, for example? The matter is vague at this point. Will 
``the manner specified in the penalty notice'' 
include an opportunity for me to go in person with the form and to hand it into a police station? 
 Those questions are simple. If the Minister has answered them before, he can draw my attention to Hansard and I will read it. However, I do not believe that he has.

Charles Clarke: For the eighth time, I am asked the same question, but I will try to answer it as fully as I can.
 First, under clause 4(3)(a), the 
``request must be made...in the manner specified in the penalty notice''. 
Secondly, clause 3(3) details the form of the penalty notice. It states that the 
``notice must...be in the prescribed form...state the alleged offence...give such particulars of the circumstances alleged to constitute the offence as are necessary...specify the suspended enforcement period...state the amount of the penalty...state the justices' chief executive to whom, and the address at which, the penalty may be paid; and''— 
this is the important point— 
``inform the person to whom it is given of his right to ask to be tried for the alleged offence and explain how that right may be exercised''. 
Clause 3(5) states clearly that the form of the notice will be established through regulations laid before the House in the conventional way. When the discussion began, I brandished—in the way referred to by the hon. Member for North Wiltshire—the tear-off slip of the fixed penalty notice that is currently used by the Metropolitan police for traffic offences. By giving that example, I tried to show how the system might work. That document contains a large amount of information on how to deal with that in the way that is specified. 
 The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Bedfordshire raised the question of the post and the 21 days that are allowed. He must be familiar with the fact that, in practice, further action is not taken on the 22nd day; leeway is built in to deal with the sort of eventuality that he described. That is how the court system in Britain is administered. In any case, an enforcement for court can set aside the fine and direct a trial in the interests of justice—someone may argue that the case has not been justly dealt with by other means.

Nicholas Lyell: Will the Minister give way?

Charles Clarke: No, I am not going to give way again. I have already answered the question as many times as I can. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman thinks that what I have said is inadequate, he is entitled to his opinion and no doubt he will vote with the Liberal Democrats that the clause should not be part of the Bill. However, I have done my best to describe the process as clearly as I can for the whole Committee and for the right hon. and learned Gentleman in particular.

Oliver Heald: The Minister may have missed part of the point. Throughout the years, in all sorts of cases—civil and criminal cases—there have been problems over the service of documents, the giving of documents and what that means in terms of procedure. I give the example of the service of a summons, which is the service of a document. Rule 99(1) of the magistrates courts rules runs to the best part of a page and explains how the document could be served, making the requirements clear, so that there is no argument about it.
 The point that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire is making is that, given the problems that can arise, what is the rule for the service of that particular request? It is not unreasonable to ask that question, given the many times that problems have arisen in that regard. The Minister may say, ``If the person posts it a day before the 21 days are up and he can prove he posted it then, that is good enough.'' I think that that is known as the postal rule. In civil cases, it does apply. 
 I cannot understand why the Minister is not able to answer that question. It comes up in every circumstance where a document must be served. His officials will be well apprised of the matter. He is sitting next to a lawyer from the Lord Chancellor's Department, who must come across the problem all the time. I am sure that he can give us a better answer and explain what will happen. What will the postal rule be in this situation?

David Lock: I am concerned that the hon. Gentleman is dancing a series of angels on the head of a pin. He is right to refer to the rules. Is it not right that these matters are always sorted out in secondary legislation and in rules? He is asking my hon. Friend, the Minister of State, Home Office for details of precisely how the system will be structured. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that this is not the place for precise details? For the reasons that he has set out, the matter should be sorted out in rules. We should move on and consider only matters that it is proper to consider.

Oliver Heald: I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for making that point because I cannot find any provision in that part of the Bill that would allow for such rules to be made. Is the Minister able to identify where those rules are to be grounded?

Charles Clarke: Clause 3(5).

Oliver Heald: That makes my point. That contains the power to make regulations about the prescription of the penalty notice. We are not talking about that now. We are talking about the way in which the notice in clause 3 is to be served. That is not listed as one of the provisions to be prescribed under clause 3(3), 3(5) or 3(6), unless the Minister is telling me I am wrong.

Charles Clarke: At the risk of being repetitive—I have said this so many times— clause 3(3)(g) states that one of the things on the penalty notice is to:
``inform the person to whom it is given of his right to ask to be tried for the alleged offence and explain how that right may be exercised.'' 
Clause 3(5) states that that will be done by order, in the way that the Parliamentary Secretary has indicated.

Oliver Heald: Yes, but the prescription is for the form of the penalty notice: I refer to clause 3(3)(a). The clause states what is to be within the notice, but the point that the Minister was making, as I understood it, was that there was an order-making power to deal with the issue of how to give the request. I do not see that, unless the Parliamentary Secretary would like to intervene again.

David Lock: This is the last time that I will rise. Clause 4(3) states:
 ``Such a request must be made by a notice given by A— 
 (a) in the manner specified in the penalty notice''. 
How that is to be ascribed in the notice will be set out in regulations to be made under clause (3)(3)(g). Accordingly, if the hon. Gentleman links the two provisions, he will see beyond a shadow of doubt—it should be clear even to him—that the terms of the penalty notice specified in regulations will include the manner in which the request for a trial is to be exercised in accordance with clause 4(3).

Oliver Heald: The Parliamentary Secretary should not shake his head; this is an important point.

Nicholas Lyell: With the help of the Parliamentary Secretary and the Minister, we are focusing on the point, which is that the Secretary of State must in his regulations explain how the rights may be exercised. We have been asking the Minister to tell us, but so far, apart from telling us that the Secretary of State must do so, he has gone no further. That is my worry; does my hon. Friend share it?

Oliver Heald: Yes. The provision says that the form will be prescribed; fine. Clause 3(3)(g) says that the notice must inform the person of the way in which his right may be exercised. Clause 4(3) says that the request must be made
``in the manner specified in the penalty notice''. 
I fully understand all that, but is the Parliamentary Secretary saying that that will include a provision on what amounts to effective service of the request for trial? If so, will he give us detail about what he has in mind?

Simon Hughes: May I break the habit of a lifetime and say that on this issue I think that Ministers are right, although we have not had the answer to the question? It is clear to me that there is a power under secondary legislation to table regulations that deal with the procedure, and in the procedure the process will be explained. I think that is what Ministers are saying, and I share that interpretation. I hope that they will register that they owe me one later, because this is a rare occurrence.
 However, there is a substantive issue, because we have not seen the guidance, so it would be helpful, earlier rather than later, to have the regulations, or at least the draft of them—it would be helpful if Ministers would tell us whether they have, somewhere on their desks, in their brief or with their officials, all the bits and pieces: the annexes to the Bill; secondary legislation; guidance; and the rest. I think that that would deal with a lot of the obfuscation.

Nicholas Lyell: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; he is my Member of Parliament in London and he was my late mother-in-law's Member of Parliament in London. I hope that he will agree that, in the context of parking, if we do not get things right to the letter, we are into a nightmare of correspondence. That is my experience when dealing with people who had friends and relations who were well capable of helping them, however frustrated they were. People being served with fixed penalty notices are often likely not to be terribly well educated, and if it is not clear—

Jimmy Hood: Order. I asked members of the Committee to make interventions brief and to the point, and not turn them into speeches. If they want to make contributions to the debate, they can do so.

Simon Hughes: I accept the proposition of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. I represent many hon. Members when they are in London, and many have come to me in the past year to ask for my help in taking up an issue that they have been unable to resolve. If people in this league are not able to sort out problems of administration with local or central Government, and have to come to their Member of Parliament, it does not hold out much hope for rest of the citizenry of the country who are in difficulty.
 There are numerous Appeal Court decisions on the process surrounding the forms used for fixed penalties for parking and motoring offences. Hundreds of cases have ended up there, because people have argued about the breathalyser process or the parking ticket process. 
 I think that the Ministers are correct in their interpretation of clauses 3 and 4, but I would like them to tell us when we are to have sight of the process regulations and all the other things that are referred to as coming later in the Bill? We can barely contain our excitement.

Nicholas Lyell: I shall be very brief, Mr. Hood—your reproof was quite rightly made. The Minister has answered me as far as he can, in that he has pointed out that the Secretary of State will be under a statutory duty to make it crystal clear, pursuant to clause 3(3)(g), how the right to opt for trial may be exercised.
 The Minister has suggested by waving some document from the Metropolitan police that there may be some precedent for the provisions. It would be very helpful if, perhaps at our next meeting on Thursday, he could come up with precedent to meet the case. I seek not to prolong our proceedings but to attain clarity in what I believe to be a matter of great importance. 
 Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Sitting suspended. 
 On resuming—

Clause 6 - Secretary of state's guidance

Oliver Heald: I beg to move amendment No. 97, in page 4, line 15, leave out `issue guidance' and insert—
`by order issue a Code of Practice'.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 14, in page 4, line 20, at end insert—
`( ) about the account to be taken by constables of the means of a person to be served with a penalty notice to pay the penalty specified in the notice.'.
 No. 112, in clause 6, page 4, line 20, at end add — 
`(d) in issuing guidance hereunder the Secretary of State shall now regard to the need 
 (i) not to issue a penalty notice in circumstances where to do so involved a significant risk of exacerbating the potential for disorder 
 (ii) to encourage and not to diminish the opportunity for reparations and restorative justice.'.
 No. 98, in page 4, line 20, at end add— 
`( ) No order shall be made under this section unless a draft of it has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

Oliver Heald: The amendment would require that the guidance under clause 6 should be in the form of a statutory code of practice and would place the Secretary of State under a duty to issue such guidance.
 Amendment No. 14 would require the guidance to explain the account that constables should take of the means of the person who is given a fixed penalty notice. Amendment No. 112 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the need not to issue a fixed penalty notice, when to do so would involve a significant risk of exacerbating the potential for disorder. It would also encourage, and not diminish, the opportunities for reparations for restorative justice. Amendment No. 98 would require the affirmative resolution procedure to be employed in respect of the order approving the code of practice. 
 The guidance is important. We have heard a great deal about it, although we have not seen a draft. I know that the Minister will find that a repetitive strain.

Charles Clarke: But powerful none the less.

Oliver Heald: Indeed.
 The guidance deals with the exercise of the constable's discretion in issuing of the fixed penalty notice, and it is designed to encourage good practice. Had we seen the draft guidance, I should have been far less keen for it to be in the form of a code of practice and should have preferred to have debated it here. The Committee should have an opportunity to debate something as important as the guidance, on which the Minister has relied on numerous occasions in explaining the Bill's provisions. I should have been happy to debate it in Committee, but as the Bill was put together at short notice, the guidance is obviously not ready. 
 The Police Federation has concerns about the difficulty that a police officer might face when trying to decide how severe an offence is and whether it merits a fixed penalty notice. The Minister made that point in our first sitting. On the vexed issue of compensation for criminal damage, he promised that no case in which a person can be identified as the victim would result in a fixed penalty notice, so those people would not be deprived of compensation. He has told us that he will issue guidance to make clear the type of offence with which the scheme is designed to deal. That shows that he clearly recognises the importance of the guidance. 
 Various points have been made about the issuing of notices, which is another aspect of the guidance. We believe that matters of such importance should be dealt with in a code of practice that has been debated by Parliament. One can understand what the Bill means in practice only if one has seen the guidance, so it should be debated. 
 With regard to the means of the accused person, to which amendment No. 14 refers, we need to see the guidance because of the breadth of the discretion involved. In our first sitting, the Minister said: 
 ``Regarding the inability of the poor to pay on time, we believe that there is flexibility in the situation. The hon. Gentleman discussed potential police victimisation. Police officers already have discretion in how they deal with offenders. They can charge, caution or move on someone whom they find committing an offence. Fixed penalties are simply an additional power in the repertoire that is already used professionally by the police. We do not accept the charge that this is a charter for incompetent police, which is what has been suggested.—[Official Report, Standing Committee F, 6 February 2001; c. 28.] 
 The Police Federation and members of the Committee want to know how he expects that discretion to be used. If we are not be told in Committee, the House should have an opportunity to find out at a later date.

Nicholas Lyell: The Committee will be struck by the common sense encapsulated in amendment No. 112—although I should point out that the printed version should have read ``have regard'' rather than ``now regard''.
 Bedfordshire police drew the first point in the amendment to the attention of the Home Office in its response to the consultation. It concerns situations in which it would clearly be inflammatory to issue a penalty notice on the spot, rather than to arrest the alleged offender and take him or her back to a police station. The Secretary of State should consider including such wise advice in his guidance to the police. It would encourage them to exercise restraint on occasions when otherwise they might not do so. 
 In the political world, Governments of both complexions have for many years encouraged a sense of toughness on law and order. Indeed, I am in favour of firmness, so long as it is coupled with fairness. Policing should be proportionate, and amendment No. 112 recommends that in proposed paragraph (d)(i). 
 The second point is designed to encourage and not diminish the opportunity for reparations and restorative justice. Whether or not the Minister likes my phraseology, I think that I am pushing at an open door here, so I hope to receive a positive response to that suggestion. The Government have rightly picked up the concept of restorative justice and run with it. I have no quarrel with them over that; my only quarrel is that sometimes they claim to have invented it—but I remind myself that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. I remember seeing an excellent example of restorative justice in Aylesbury under the aegis of the chief constable of Thames Valley police. To their credit, the Government have wisely continued that policy, which, along with the general products of the Narey report, started under the previous Government, of which I was a member. The amendment points up two features along those lines, so I hope for a satisfactory response.

Jackie Ballard: I support the amendments, but I shall speak only briefly because I was unable to attend the Committee's earlier sitting and have not had the benefit of either hearing the bulk of the debate or reading the Hansard report. The Committee will be aware of the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey on fixed penalty notices in general, which I share. It is a pity that the Minister has not been able to bring the guidance notes to the Committee for us to examine. Fixed penalty notices are controversial and shift the burden of proof, and it would have been useful if the Committee could have seen the guidance. Amendment No. 112 might not then have been necessary.
 The provision gives the police wide discretion, so it is important that they are aware of Parliament's concerns and the matters that should be taken into account before deciding whether to issue fixed penalty notices. Amendment No. 14 refers to 
``the means of a person'' 
but that may not be obvious, and perhaps the words ``as far as is feasible'' should be added. Even the richest people, when they are drunk and disorderly, can look dishevelled and poor.

David Lock: To what extent does the hon. Lady suggest that it is appropriate for police officers to make detailed inquiries into people's means before issuing fixed penalty notices? Is she suggesting that they undertake a full inquiry into someone's income, outgoings, capital position, mortgage rate and so on before issuing a fixed penalty notice in the street? What precisely is she proposing?

Jackie Ballard: I am not proposing; I am supporting. I am certainly not suggesting that police constables carry around 40-page income support application forms and insist that people in the street fill them in. However, someone who is obviously homeless is unlikely to have great means—although when I was a psychiatric social worker, I had one client who was apparently homeless and carried her belongings around in carrier bags but owned nine houses in the east end of London. It is often possible for police constables to have some idea of people's means, although the clues are not always easy. It is not an exact science and I am certainly not suggesting that application forms such as those for means-tested benefits should be handed out.
 Amendment No. 112 would be particularly useful. As we discussed at an earlier sitting, issuing a fixed penalty notice might exacerbate a situation and cause more disorder than it solves. It is important that police officers should have to take account of the chance of reparation to victims, which might be lost if fixed penalty notices were issued and the penalties paid immediately so that nothing further happened.

Charles Clarke: I hope that, on consideration, the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire will withdraw the amendment, for reasons that I shall give.
 The amendments fall into two categories. The first includes those that would constrain points of direction to the guidance that the Secretary of State will publish, for a variety of reasons. We are entirely satisfied that subsection (a), which enables the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the exercise of discretion, already allows for the advice detailed in the amendments to be issued to the police. 
 Amendment No. 112 refers to restorative justice. The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Bedfordshire is right in saying that the work being done by the Thames Valley police authority under the leadership of the chief constable, Sir Charles Pollard, has been extremely constructive. It will be proper in areas where there are successful adult restorative justice schemes for those to be taken into account when deciding how best to deal with disorderly offenders. 
 Most programmes of restorative justice that are currently in operation, particularly in the Thames Valley police authority area, are directed principally at juveniles, so would not be relevant to the fixed penalty notice system, which is aimed at 18-year-olds and above, rather than 16 and 17-year-olds, but that does not detract from the force of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's argument that restorative justice is important and should be taken into account. I believe that the formulation in subsection (c) is right. It states that guidance should be issued 
``with a view to encouraging good practice in connection with the operation of the provisions of this Chapter'' 
and allows developments in restorative justice and elsewhere to proceed appropriately. 
 While I commend the issues identified by Opposition Members for inclusion in the guidance, they are but a few of the many that the Secretary of State will need to bear in mind when issuing guidance. There is always the danger that, by naming those that are in the amendments, the comparative importance of others will be perceived as being diminished. 
 I also believe that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary made a substantial point on the assessment of means. During our proceedings, the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey has advised every person approached by a police officer on these matters to take to their heels and flee. I am not sure how the backside of a fleeing miscreant can give the information on means that the amendment would require.

Jackie Ballard: I must speak for my hon. Friend, who cannot speak for himself. As I understand it, he was not advising every young miscreant to flee. He was saying that, if he was in that position, he would flee.

Charles Clarke: I am glad that that has been clarified. I do not want to misrepresent the hon. Gentleman, especially in his absence, but it was certainly my impression that he felt that fleeing was an appropriate course of action for anybody caught in such circumstances.

Nick Hawkins: Sadly, the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey is not with us at this late stage but, as the Minister will recall, he not talked about the example that he would set, but was extending the terminology regarded as acceptable in parliamentary terms in relation to the state that he thought he might have been in when he was about to flee.

Charles Clarke: I thought that the phrase ``by the seat of his pants'' seemed peculiarly appropriate. Although the seat of one's pants, as my hon. Friends sitting behind me can tell me now, can often be a guide to a person's affluence, that is not always the case.
 Some of the issues that have been identified, particularly in relation to restorative justice, are serious and appropriate. We certainly want to develop good practice in that area. 
 Amendment No. 97 would replace the guidance with codes of practice, subject to affirmative resolution. I do not want to rehearse the debate about affirmative resolution, but the Government believe that codes of practice are used specifically to safeguard the rights of the individual. Examples can be found in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, under which a statutory code is necessary to set out the rights of persons in police detention or those stopped in the street and searched. Indeed, recently the House debated in Committee the codes of practice under the Terrorism Act 2000, where the same issues are involved. 
 The new penalty notice scheme is entirely different. It contains no coercive powers. I emphasise again that the individual's right to request trial is not jeopardised by the process. The scheme merely offers an offender a way of discharging liability to conviction by paying a penalty. The offender's rights are completely preserved: he is as free to have his case heard by a court as he would have been had the scheme not existed, so a code of practice of the type proposed in amendment No. 97 is unnecessary. Guidance issued by the Secretary of State is the time-honoured and appropriate way for Governments of all parties to deal with such matters when new arrangements are introduced. That is why we want to introduce the new fixed penalty scheme. 
 I can give the Committee, and particularly the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Bedfordshire, the assurance that issues around restorative justice could and should be taken into account in developing best practice in these areas. I also reaffirm the assurances that I gave earlier about the issues that the guidance will address. I believe that those assurances address most of the concerns expressed by Committee members. 
 I am slightly more dubious about the phrase 
``the account to be taken by constables of the means of a person to be served with a penalty notice'', 
because it is difficult to understand how a police officer might interpret that role. I can tell the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire that I am prepared to talk to the Association of Chief Police Officers to see whether there is a way of dealing with that, but I cannot immediately see how it can be done. 
 I hope that, on consideration, the hon. Gentleman will be prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Oliver Heald: As we shall be able to return to the subject on Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 - Notification of court and date of trial

Oliver Heald: I beg to move amendment No. 100, in page 4, line 24, leave out `by' and insert `before'.

Jimmy Hood: With this we may take the following amendments: No. 99, in
 page 4, line 24, leave out 
`the offence will be tried' 
and insert— 
`and the time at which, he must appear'. 
No. 101, in page 4, line 25, at end insert— 
`( ) A warning notice shall be given in the manner prescribed by order made by the Secretary of State, such power to be exercisable by statutory instrument. 
 ( ) Such an instrument shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament'.
 No. 111, in page 5, line 3, leave out subsection (7).

Oliver Heald: Amendments Nos. 100 and 99 would make the date given in the warning notice an appointment to arrange a trial date rather than the trial date itself. Amendment No. 101 would require the manner of giving a warning notice to be prescribed by order. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Bedfordshire will no doubt speak to amendment No. 111.
 I shall start with amendments Nos. 100 and 99. If a warning notice with a fixed trial date is given, the officer in the case will have to attend court if the accused fails to pay and requests to be tried. I wonder how many accused will fail to attend. What assessment has the Minister made of that? If the practice of requesting trial and failing to attend becomes established, it could prove time-consuming for officers. Surely it would be better to see whether the accused attends and means what he says, and then set a trial date.

David Lock: Would it assist the hon. Gentleman if I tell him that, while we cannot accept, for technical reasons, the form in which the amendments are drafted, we are prepared to consider the underlying principle—to provide more information to the accused about when he needs to attend before trial in the unusual circumstances set out in the clause. We are prepared to table at a later date amendments that are similar in substance, though not in form.

Oliver Heald: That is very helpful, and I shall not say any more about amendments Nos. 100 and 99.
 Amendment No. 101 would require the manner of giving a warning notice to be prescribed. As the notice is to be in lieu of a summons, should there not be similar provisions as to jurisdiction and service as apply to a summons? If not, can the Minister explain briefly why? I mentioned earlier the provisions in rule 99 of the magistrates courts rules about the way in which summonses are to be served. Before issuing a summons, magistrates are supposed to give careful consideration to the question of jurisdiction. The magistrates manual states: 
 ``This applies ... in order to proceed to hear an information for a summary offence outside the commission area in which it is alleged to have been committed, it must appear to the justice ... necessary or expedient, with a view to the better administration of justice, for a person charged'' 
to be dealt with in that way. Has the Minister given any thought to that issue of jurisdiction?

Nicholas Lyell: Amendment No. 111 suggests that subsection (7) be removed. The subsection says:
 ``If a person has been given a warning notice, section 14 of the Act of 1980 (proceedings invalid where accused did not know of them) does not apply.''
 I believe that the clause would be better if those words were left out. 
 The structure of the Bill is rightly designed to cut down the amount of bureaucracy needed to impose a modest penalty on a miscreant without the need for criminal proceedings, but it is not designed to keep out of the courts cases in which an alleged offender contests the allegations and wants to be tried. There is a real risk that, for some reason or other, there will be a misunderstanding in the penalty notices or something that is thought to have been given is not received, is simply forgotten about—which may not be good enough for the purposes of the amendment—goes astray in the post or arrives after magistrates have dealt with the matter. 
 In a sense, subsection (7) is a belt and braces provision. In effect, it states that even if the alleged offender who wishes to have his case tried knows nothing about having been told to appear at a certain magistrates court, he will none the less be deemed to have known about it. Nothing could be done about that, and that would be wrong. If we were to leave a window open so that an alleged offender could tell the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts that he was never served and that he wants to contest the assertion, the result would not be a large number of cases. Rather, it would provide the opportunity to avoid injustice in genuine cases. 
 Subsection (7) is unnecessary, and it would be wise to leave open the window to which I have referred. New clause 5—which is not to be discussed now, but which works along lines similar to the amendment—would also give a window of opportunity for justice to be done when something has gone wrong or has not quite connected. I commend the amendment to the Ministers, and I hope that they will accept it immediately. If they cannot, I hope that they will at least think about it seriously, and I look forward to their response. 
 Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Sutcliffe.] 
Adjourned accordingly at three minutes to Ten o'clock till Thursday 15 February at five minutes to Ten o'clock.